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Background

1. WIM - Wolnosc i Niezalezosc (Freedom and Independence) was born from the will and determination of the Polish Underground leaders and members of the AK (Armia Krajowa) - Underground Army during the German occupation, to preserve and continue the ideology which prompted the Polish people to resist first the Germans, and then after Germany's defeat, the Russian-Soviet invaders. New conditions, and changed circumstances demanded reorganization of premises, methods and objectives. Germany and the Gestapo were one thing, the Communist push, the Red Army's advance, then Soviet occupation, NKVD and UB infiltration were another.
2. During the first half of 1944, the AK consisted of some 600,000 men and women organized into first line troops, partisan and diversionary detachments, special liaison and engineer units, with a fully built-up chain of command, service, propaganda, supply, educational, medical and Women's Auxiliary units. Efficiently functioning intelligence and counter-intelligence, radio and other liaison units kept commanders in the field in steady contact with HQ and the underground Government in Poland. There existed also officer and non-com training schools.
3. The Red Army entered Poland in Jan 1944 and by June, arrived at the Vistula, occupying half of pre-1939 Polish territory. Just before the Red Army's entry into Poland, the High Command of the AK in conjunction with the underground Government and the Government in exile decided to increase sabotage and partisan activity, and it was then that the fighting forest units were developed in full strength with the objective of operating in the German Army's rear in cooperation with the Red Army. This operation called "Operation Burza" put into action just ahead of the advancing Soviet Army came into full swing in March 1944 and continued till September of that same year; whole Polish underground divisions took part in this operation and as they went into action established contact with the Soviet commanders, thus strictly adhering to orders received from the Government in Exile. Thanks to this contact with the Red Army, these units laid themselves open to NKVD penetration. Mass arrests and deportations took place in the trail of the Red Army's advance. Not all units of the AK could take part in operation Burza; and not all units were able to take part in full strength - there was a lack of weapons, especially rifles, machine guns and automatic weapons. Units in full strength were only used in the Warsaw uprising.

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4. Cooperation with the Red Army started when the former crossed the old Polish 1939 frontier and was continued until the Red Army arrived at the line of the Vistula-Wisloka, and was still in action when the Soviets crossed the Vistula in the Kielce region. (July 1944)
5. As the Red Army advanced, the NKVD disarmed and arrested all those from the AK they could lay their hands on. Mass deportations to Siberia then started. Many members of the AK were also killed during the round-up by the NKVD.
6. This experience in connection with Burza became known to the AK west of the Vistula-Wisloka and cooperation with the Red Army was eliminated. Burza ended in January 1945 when the AK was dissolved by Presidential decree. This decree reached certain out of the way units only in March. The majority of the AK was sent home, with orders to stay alerted. This decree found most members of the rank and file of the AK unwilling to disband, and units recruited from regions occupied by the Red Army were simply unable to go home. The persecution of those who had gone home kept many in the forests, and many reported back after having been disbanded. Orders by the High Command of the AK to liquidate the AK never actually meant a complete cessation of its existence, and were given mainly to reduce the contingents, and to disband the front line units. With the Presidential decree of January 1945, came orders to General Okulicki, who had succeeded General Bor-Komorowski as CIG of the AK, to build an underground organization with long-range objectives basing it on new manpower considerations. This organization was called NIE and was still military in character. Two situations developed immediately after this NIE was started: the UB had penetrated it in its first stages, and the political leadership which had not been consulted about NIE protested its existence and NIE was abandoned. After the arrest of General Okulicki and of the 15 leaders of the Polish underground Government, Col Rzepecki assumed the leadership.
7. It is necessary to remind the reader here that political decisions and leadership in Poland were in the hands of the Rada Jednosci Narodowej which was the underground parliament, and of the underground Government in Poland, the head of which was at the same time Deputy Premier of the Government in Exile in London; the CIG of the AK was included in this governing body. In April 1945 after the 16 leaders were arrested, a meeting of the Presidium of the Rada Jednosci with the Delegate of the Government was held; Rzepecki was present. It was decided that the Underground must continue, but was to be reorganized as a civilian, and non-military movement. Instead of the title, CIG of the AK, the appellation "Delegate of the Armed Forces" was chosen. The first duty of this delegate was to demobilize the military units, and to send the more threatened members of the AK west to the Recovered Territories and abroad. New leaders and underground workers were chosen, transferred to new regions, and settled for the civilian resistance. The network was gradually transformed and re-educated to be a political body using different methods and ways to combat Communism. The first half of 1945 thus saw a new, non-military but political underground come to life: WIN. The AK ceased to exist, but its members filled the cadres of WIN although it would be wrong to conclude that WIN is made up of exclusively AK men and women.
8. A word must be said here about other underground factions which operated during the German occupation, and either operated with the AK or outside of it. The National Democratic Party had its own military underground units initially called NOZ (Narodowa Organizacja Wojskowa - National Military Organization) and a part of the AK. Another National Democratic faction and also military under the name of NSZ (Narodowe Sily Zbrojne - National Armed Forces) did not cooperate with the AK and acted on its own. When orders for the disbandment of the AK came through, these two military organizations would not comply, created a new underground naming it NZW (Narodowe Zjednoczenie Wojskowe - National Military Association), and decided to continue the armed conflict against the occupiers. The rank and file never actually caught on to this new name (NZW), and it was popularly known as NSZ. A part of the real NSZ which was under the influence of the ONR (Oboz Narodowo Radykalny - National Radical Camp, a pre-war ultra-right wing of the National Democratic Party with fascist leanings) continued operating on its own. The NZW on the other hand, or rather that part of it which was directly under the National Democratic Party, which at that time was the majority party in the Government of Mr Arciszewski in London, and therefore, was responsible for the policy of disbandment of the AK decided to continue armed action in conjunction with the NSZ although the representative of the ND was present and took part in the meeting of the Presidium and Delegate, and voted also for a cessation of armed action, and reorganization for political and civilian resistance.

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In 1945, Moscow used old Polish Party (PPR) whilst Germany occupied Poland. This same PPR with the help of its secret service, the UB and communist agents organized three other parties: the PPS (Polish Socialist Party), the SL (Stronnictwo Ludowe - Popular Party) and the SD (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne - Democratic Party). This new political leadership of Moscow creation arrived with the Red Army, and by its very presence, backed by the NKVD and the UB went to work to break up the united political front which had functioned during the Nazi occupation.

10. The SL in London following Mr Mikolajczyk marched out of the Government in Exile. He and most of his collaborators returned to Poland after having concluded the Moscow agreements. The underground SL in Poland with few exceptions did not join the Moscow sponsored SL and created a new party under the PSL (Polska Partya Ludowa - Polish Popular Party) which joined the Government of National Unity in Lublin and later in Warsaw. As time went on, this party became the opposition openly; their underground ceased to exist with Mikolajczyk's arrival.
11. The Labour Party - SP (Stronnictwo Pracy) tried to follow the PSL and the leader Popiel returned to Poland. This party was, however, unable to muster a mass following, and after the PPR demanded that the SP merge with that tailored by Moscow, the leadership dissolved the party and fled abroad.
12. The PPS. Part of the exiled leaders and those who had gathered around the MN - Wolnosc, Rownosc, Niespodleglosc (Freedom, Equality, Independence) joined the communist-sponsored PPS. The majority, however, chose to continue underground using the regime PPS as a screen, and promoting opposition among the rank and file of their members.
13. The SN. (Stronnictwo Narodowe - National Party/National Democrats) were branded as fascistic by the Moscow sponsors, and so the communists did not create a dummy SN in Poland. As a consequence, none of the leaders, most of whom were in exile, returned to Poland. As shown above in connection with the military activity and decisions in connection with the AK disbandment, there was no unity among this group ideologically; the majority, however, was in favour of armed resistance, of sabotage of all and everything under the influence of its leaders who were abroad. Only a fraction of the SN decided to work for long-range objectives; another fraction tried to establish themselves as a legitimate political party: seven leaders with Bielawski at their head went to see President Bierut with this project in view, and were promptly arrested. Another group, the fascistic ONR which dominates the NSZ decided to collaborate with the regime under the guise of lay Catholicism, and became active under Piasiecki by promoting the new idea of Christian Communism - the outward expression of their ideas finds an outlet in the publication "Dzis i Jutro".
14. There are also some smaller groups in existence at the time of MN's birth: The Sanacya groups, Stronnictwo Niezawislosci Politycznej - Political Independence Party under Col Lipinski, and Polskie Stronnictwo Demokratyczne - Polish Democratic Party under the ex-Governor Jozefski; both with little influence and small in numbers stayed underground. At the same time in London, after Mikolajczyk's exit, a Government under the socialist leader Arciszewski was formed; it was composed of the SN who were in the majority, the PPS and the SP. The Delegate in Poland, and vice-Premier of the Government in London was a member of the PSL, Korhonski. This political milieu very soon created differences of opinion, and a lack of unity in Poland where only a common front could resist the communist onslaught. During the months of April till June 1945, the underground leaders in Poland whose common experience during the war years kept them cooperating with each other, decided to organize the above mentioned long-range resistance with the sole objective of holding out. The SL was already in open opposition, and of course the NSZ-NSW was not cooperating. The London Government and the military, (Gen Anders) were in favor of short-range objectives, and going along with the SN. At the end of June 1945, the leaders in Poland held meetings, during which Korhonski laid down his position and July 1st the so-called "Delegatura" disbanded. It became apparent during these meetings that the leadership in the country withdrew its confidence from the London set-up. In the end, on 10 August 1945, Col Rzepecki announced that the office of the Delegate of the Armed Forces in Poland had ceased to exist.
15. The public, in spite of all this political confusion, remained under the influence of the AK ideology; this was also true of very numerous elements in the new Polish (Zymierski) Army. The population was ignorant of the fact that Poland was now abandoned to the Soviet which it hated, and whose stooges were despised. This ignorance caused danger of armed assaults which in Poland's position had no chances of either military or political success. The eastern

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provinces where the communists the UB had shown their hand from the early days of Soviet advance were aware of the situation; in the West however there was a very real danger of the public being led astray because the communists masked their objectives by patriotic and national slogans. The underground leaders stepped in to guide and direct, and unmask the communists. So WIN, the political, but non-partisan, and for the time being non-military underground movement came to be.

16. Activities in the underground remained very much unchanged after WIN took over. As described above WIN grew gradually out of the situation created by the entry of the Red Army into Poland, and the problems involved in facing this new situation. Thus, no actual date can be established when it took over; it is more a question of the time when more precise organizational and ideological frames were given movement which had been growing; during the first half of 1945. New methods of activity and conspiratorial work had to be adapted to the changing situation.
17. During July 1945 this concrete program was prepared, and during the first half of August decided upon, the central authority was established, and the regional leadership organized. These decisions were modified and re-adapted in January 1946 to suit conditions after experience showed this to be necessary. These were based on information from communist sources, and that received from the West. The principles laid down and the methods adopted in January 1946 are even now the foundation of WIN's activity.
18. The name WIN was not disclosed to the rank and file. The underground press published only the basic and most pressing directives. The press received new titles and names. A complete declaration of principles was published only at the end of December 1945 and included only those measures which touched upon the pre-election period. In the eastern provinces the rank and file was informed during the summer months of 1946.
19. In the meantime the UB was active, as was the NKVD. At the end of September and in October 1945 arrests of WIN leaders took place; it only then became apparent that most of the leadership was under closest observation of the secret services. Rzepiecki and most of his staff were imprisoned. The liaison network abroad and the special intelligence net were disrupted. In the field, the leader of the Southern Region and a few of his collaborators were arrested, as was the leader of the Central Region (Warsaw) and of Lublin. The central authority went to the leader of the Western Region, but he also was arrested after two weeks. Among the rank and file only Bydgoszcz came under fire. These arrests destroyed the Central Authority, and made some dents in the field, but did not ruin the movement. The Regions reorganized themselves immediately. This was made possible because of the system adopted by which the different cells worked in isolation and independently of each other. Only the trials brought WIN and organization to light. After this first phase of arrests, Col Niepokolczycki, the deputy leader of the Southern Region was elected chairman.
20. The Aims and ideological objectives of WIN:

The name itself describes the main objectives: independence and freedom for the individual. WIN's principles, and basic program is as follows:

- a. Liberation and firm establishment of independence;
- b. Preservation of the frontiers in the West, reconquest of those in the East.
- c. Establishment of a political, economic, and social regime based on Christian and truly democratic principles which would allow Poland to grow in peace and stability, where freedom, social justice would be guaranteed, and each citizen could enjoy a minimum of private ownership.
- d. Education of the citizens in these principles.

Points 1 & 4 clearly define the aims, and show that WIN's activity does not cease with the reconquest of Poland's independence. To point 3 it must be stated that it is based on the declaration of the Rada Jednosci Narodowej of 1943; the starting point will perforce be the situation which will prevail in Poland when independence is regained, and it presupposes a transitional period; it is also obvious that certain facts accomplished will exist which can not be reversed. WIN believes that the constitution of 1935 must be amended, and that methods of Government in use before 1939 must be eliminated. WIN demands that immediate free and unfettered elections be held once independence has been achieved. The Polish public has shown such political maturity during these

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difficult years and such ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ is confident that elected representatives of the Nation will know and be able to introduce proper reforms and methods of Government.

21. WIN bases its political thinking on the premise that every law and state structure runs the danger of being distorted when put to the test; it is because of this awareness that WIN puts the greatest weight on point 4 of its program: the moral problem. The fight for the Nation's souls and especially that of youth is at this time its most important objective.

WIN's Policy Based on Evaluation of the International Situation in 1946/47

22. WIN, possessing currently obtained information from the Communist and Soviet camp, analyzed and evaluated the situation and the Soviet strategy and methods.
23. This evaluation led WIN to the following conclusions:
 - a. The USSR looks upon the present period as their sole opportunity to achieve Russian imperialist aims and to fulfill their world-communist program; the USSR in no case is ready to abandon this opportunity, even if external pressure should delay the achievement of these objectives.
 - c. The Western powers want to preserve peace at a price, and to attain this aim will be willing to compromise on problems which to them seem secondary but in the end they will have to oppose Russian and communist expansion.
 - d. The Western powers look upon the problem of central Europe and therefore of Poland as a secondary problem.
 - e. To Russia this region is not only important from the point of view of their communist aims, but also because the USSR has planned to incorporate these countries into the Soviet Union. Poland and its geo-political situation is to Russia a key position: without Poland the USSR cannot keep central Europe and without this it cannot hope to dominate western Europe.
 - f. If Poland should have to stay under Soviet domination for good, not only would its independence be a foreclosed matter, but its existence as a nation would be questionable.
 - g. An armed conflict with the West is unavoidable, it may not take place immediately but time is on the side of USSR. The communist strategy and tactics aided by their Fifth Columns in all countries will pave the way.
 - h. WIN can delay the process of Poland's sovietization and its incorporation into the Soviet Union, but cannot reconquer Poland's independence in the present conditions. WIN does not expect an internal breakdown of the communist Soviet regime and considers such speculation to be absolutely vain.
 - i. WIN's conviction is that a reconquest of independence and a guarantee of national existence can only be obtained by leaning upon the West with which Poland is linked by unbreakable ties of culture and Christian civilization. In spite of Poland's situation resulting from the Teheran and Yalta agreements Poland's place is and can only be with the West.
 - j. Following the Teheran and Yalta decisions Poland is now under the heel of the USSR and because of this fact a fraction of the nation will be forced to take part in the conflict on the Soviet side: WIN aims to keep this part of the Polish forces at a minimum.
 - k. Danger from the German side is still a very real problem. To justify the taking of half of Poland's eastern territories, the USSR backed the frontier, on the Oder and on the Neisse. The USSR expelled millions of Poles from the eastern territories; the ex-German territories were depopulated because of the exodus before the Russian invasion and because of the transfer of remaining Germans under the Potsdam agreement. These territories now have been colonized and reconstructed by some 5 million Poles. This situation WIN considers

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to be an accomplished ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ either be denied nor undone. Russian policy in this connection according to WIN is : (1) fomenting even greater hatred between Poles and Germans, (2) provoking the Western powers to protest against this western frontier, (3) appearing to be the only defender of Poland's interests.

- l. Experience has taught that Germany will be difficult to satisfy by compromise solutions. Western Germany is now crowded by nationals who have come there from every eastern country during the Nazi rule and by transfer from Czechoslovakia and Poland. The danger of German-USSR collusion is real, can become a fact and Poland will pay the price.
- m. All central European nations are endangered both by German and USSR action; WIN is of the opinion that peace can only become stable if Federations or even Unions with its neighbors become a reality. WIN underscores that it wants independence not only for Poland but also for all its neighbors; on the other hand experience shows that absolute sovereignty especially for smaller nations does not guarantee their independence. Federal solutions or even nationwide unions will do away with frontier problems which for so long have been the stumbling point in relationships among Central European nations. Such a federated combine would of course join a European organization of the future.
- n. Poland lies on the main communication lines between Germany and Russia, WIN is of the opinion that a stable and enduring peace can only be guaranteed if an independent Poland keeps a balance between these two powers.
- o. Within a federal or other like combination of central European nations the Ukrainian problem can also find a solution after both Poland and the Ukraine have become independent states; both these nations can only find a prosperous future in compromising and cooperating with each other.

24. The above evaluation of Poland's international position was formed on the basis of political happenings during 1946/47 and has been instrumental in WIN's attitude toward internal Polish problems. With small deviations WIN's opinions have been confirmed by happenings in the international field and can be said to hold true even now.

25. In response to a question, WIN's representative abroad has requested that the following points be made as clear as possible in connection with the German-Polish problem:

- a. creating new and this time decisive propaganda trumps in the hands of the communists and Soviet Russia.
- b. complete and decisive discrediting of Poland's representatives in exile.
- c. elimination of a remnant of faith, influence, and sympathy for the Anglo-Saxon world, not only in Poland but also in other central European countries.
- d. neither Poland nor other neighboring countries can at this time express an opinion in connection with this problem.

26. WIN's attitude toward internal Polish problems.

- a. The attitude toward Polish Government-in-Exile in London. WIN was founded as an independent resistance group. It is not and never was sponsored by the Polish Government-in-Exile and is completely independent from it. In the past, and now WIN is critical of its political composition, its concepts, activity, or rather inactivity in connection with many problems; this brings WIN quite often into opposition to this body. On the other hand, WIN respects the legitimacy of the Government-in-Exile and uses its influence to bring about changes in the present set-up. WIN's activity is coordinated with the President and with the Prime-Minister, General Bor-Komorowski only. For technical purposes of liaison and contacts but not policy, WIN uses the help of one of the military offices attached to Gen Bor-Komorowski's cabinet. The independent attitude espoused by WIN ruled out all material help from the London set-up through 1946, and the Government-in-Exile recognized WIN only in 1947.

WIN recognizes the ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ cooperation between the exiled Polish

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25X1A

leaders and those in Poland.

b. Attitude toward political parties.

WIN fully recognizes independent political thought and freedom of action. WIN's existence is due to the fact that Moscow and the communists hunt down everything and everybody who is not sanctioned by them. In WIN's opinion there is no harm in the existence of other parallels, underground movements in Poland as long as these do not differ with each other on plans for immediate action.

WIN was founded with the concurrence of all political parties in Poland with the exception of the ONR and of course the communist party and its satellites. From then on WIN has cooperated with these political parties to the extent of also keeping contact with the PSL which was then in open opposition; the leaders of the PSL in Poland were at first unable to cooperate because of security problems, since December 1945 collaboration exists and is carried on even now. The SN in Poland concurred in WIN's existence but the SN leaders in exile never confirmed this decision; the cause for this attitude is that the exiled SN leaders demanded that WIN subordinate its activities to the Ministry of the Interior in Exile which is in SN hands. This demand like the one made by Gen Anders who is also anxious to take this underground movement over was rejected by WIN's leaders. In spite of all this, WIN continues to cooperate with the SN in Poland - this has become all the more easy because armed intervention by the undergrounds has become impossible.

WIN never had any difficulties with the PPS or its faction the WRN. WIN's most urgent motive is collaboration with all groups whose aim is Poland's independence; priority is given in this field to those groups which potentially and from the organizational point of view have the greatest influence in Poland. Such a priority is also given to those groups which influence the masses and can therefore muster mass resistance (Peasants and workers).

The difficulty in keeping contacts with Poland makes it imperative for WIN to coordinate its action abroad with the political groups and thus agreements with the PSL, PPS and SP leadership in Exile have been made.

c. Attitude toward the Catholic Church.

The Church, in WIN's opinion, is one of the main factors in the fight against communism. The Church will survive longest and will be able to carry on its activity in the open. In the spiritual and moral fields the Church can counteract communist action better and more effectively than any one else. Whenever security permits WIN coordinates its plans with the Polish Hierarchy and has the full backing of it and the clergy.

d. Attitude toward the Warsaw regime.

WIN regards the present Government in Poland to be illegal and established by force as Moscow's tool. As it is quite impossible to get rid of this Alien regime, WIN's attitude is to act in such a way that the population may be able to survive; WIN therefore once in a while backs directives which can help the population and which are necessary in daily living. On the other hand, WIN fights or tries to weaken all such laws or decrees which are meant to speed up sovietization. This latter problem is one of the main tactical principles of WIN's activity: infiltration and influence in the administration as well as within the regime's political parties and the army are used for this end. Many harmful decrees have been blunted or even changed by WIN's action and in most cases WIN was able to fool the public. During the first months of its existence the Regime only really dominated high level UB chieftains; the purges which have been carried out during the last three years have of course curtailed WIN's influence on the legislature and administration and for the present WIN is able only to keep agents in their positions for intelligence purposes.

27. Tactical principles and methods of action.

The existing situation internally and abroad has forced WIN to adopt defensive tactics and delaying action, it has also forced all the Undergrounds to give up armed resistance. This does not mean, however, that WIN is not prepared to use armed force the day conditions make it possible. Conspiratorial work and safety are extraordinarily difficult in view of the perfidious methods used by

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the UB for breaking character and lowest social elements, playing on lowest instincts and first and foremost enormous patience used in observation. Besides this, one must add that many of these already known by the UB in one region have to be transferred and put to work elsewhere. False identity papers have to be newly established every time an agent is compromised. The different cells have to be isolated which makes it very difficult to send out warnings in time. All this forces WIN to adopt changing methods which have to be very elastic.

28. WIN is forced to plan and take political decisions for short periods of time as these must follow closely communist tactics of the moment. The necessity to know the communist plans to be able to organize resistance, and take up necessary action, to warn and inform the public, to establish security measures for the organization, and on the other hand to inform Polish leaders in exile and the Western Allies, forces WIN to keep an intelligence network which covers all domains of political, economic, military and other sections of the country's life. For the present WIN must mainly be a political organization to counteract political communist action.
29. The same pertains to propaganda. It is necessary to keep a certain number of commandos to curtail communist activity in isolated spots by physical intervention. Besides all this WIN must keep its military section to take care of Zydierski's Army and be the nucleus of armed resistance when the time comes. In the end WIN must keep its branch concerned with the education of youth on the highest level as this problem is one of the most important.
30. Organization

As mentioned above no stiff organizational frames can be used. The above stated lines of action force WIN to keep a skeleton organization with its different branches but these have to be readily changeable, a description of this matter therefore can only be handled on broad and non-detailed lines.
31. At the head of the organization there is a chairman who has at his side an executive committee, and an advisory commission. The latter is composed of political leaders of the various parties and leaders from all other important branches of social life, also from educational institutions. In the first phase these commissions were called "coordinating committees" the members of which represented their own groups and held meetings. At present this is impossible for reasons of security, however, every time a policy decision has to be taken these members are consulted. On the area level there are also executive committees and advisory commissions. Matters of principle are decided collectively by the Presidium which is composed of the chairman, three members of the executive committee and three area directors. This body elects the chairman. On the lower levels leaders are nominated after they have been proposed by their committees. Decisions arrived at are carried out according to military standards. The country is divided into three areas which are subdivided into regions and counties. For work among peasantry and small town folk the territorial network is active. In greater cities this work is done according to professions.
32. The aim of WIN's skeleton organization is to have its agents in every locality, every office, and every shop, and to have at least two agents for every thousand people: in fact, these numbers have been surpassed. The special intelligence network is built up on different lines and according to the importance of the sources. For greater security, continuity of the work and to create reserves all activists are doubled: only one agent, however, is active at a time and does not know his double. The members are divided into two basic categories: ordinary members whose capabilities allow them only to be auxiliaries, and the cadres of activists who hold responsible positions and who must sacrifice most of their time to underground activity. The selection of individuals is done according to their character, up-to-date achievement and capabilities.
33. The attitude of the Polish toward WIN.

WIN has both the confidence and the good will of the public and it has great authority among the people. The best example of this was the referendum when 60 percent of the electorate voted according to WIN's instructions. This percentage has been confirmed from communist-regime sources.
34. A chronology of happenings.

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In the pre-election period WIN made every effort to prepare the public for these elections and worked to postpone them because every month gained that way delayed sovietization. It was also important to push the communists to acts of terror and blatant falsification. For these purposes a numerous network of WIN agents was kept in the field and propaganda teams were strongly re-informed. So called operation "Q" forced the communists in many cases to transfer their henchmen from one place to another.

35. To destroy the forest units the communists used provocation. This consisted in the formation of units composed of communists and calling themselves NSZ. These units terrorized the population, murdered more prominent citizens, all in the name of the underground. The UB also tried to infiltrate these forest units. After the elections the Regime undertook "pacifying operations" and actually destroyed many of these forest units. WIN suffered least from these Regime operations because of successful defensive action and good information. In the spring of 1947 WIN used the amnesty to help its own members and other underground personnel to come out into the open. All this has not, however, eliminated all forest units a few of which are still active in the Lublin area.
36. End of November 1946 Col Niepokulczycki, WIN chairman, and a few of his collaborators were arrested. From September on of that same year many arrests were made among the so-called "intelligence brigade" which was a remnant of Rzepecki's chairmanship. WIN severed its relations with this brigade already during the summer months of 1946.
37. In January of 1947 the director, nearly all the members of the committee and the commission were arrested in the central areas (Warsaw); in this area arrests made large dents in the special intelligence network. The network held in reserve in this central area immediately picked up the threads wherever the others had left them. In March 1947 a new plan for action was prepared by which conspiracy was put on a deeper level, propaganda activity was curtailed, and which put some of the members on an inactive status.
38. End of October 1947 HQ was informed that Radkiewicz (Gen, chief of the UB) received orders to liquidate WIN at any price before the end of the year. Decisions were taken according to which the liaison network was cut off and propaganda was reduced. Before these orders were executed new arrests in the liaison network were already being made and of November also mass arrests in the Rzeszow region. On 29 November 1947 WIN's new chairman was arrested. In December a few members of the central executive committee and the committee in Lower Silesia were arrested. In January 1948 HQ was reorganized, in February, however, new arrests took place. In April a new presidium was called upon which this time did not include all those who had already served for security reasons. A decision was then taken to temporarily stop all activity between the top and the lower levels and to curtail all intelligence activity so as to give UB the impression that WIN had been completely destroyed: organizational activity has, however, continued and is continuing now.
39. The delegates for abroad left Poland in July and September 1946 to normalize cooperation with the Polish leaders-in-exile and to establish secret contacts with representatives of the Western Powers as well as to reorganize contacts with Poland.
40. Contact with Poland is still functioning, but because of loss of established channels, the ever growing difficulties in Poland and lack of proper facilities cannot be called satisfactory.

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